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The provisions of law show that the qualifications (graduation, Article 171) of the electors as well as of those to be elected were matters to which the attention of the law makers, both in the Constituent Assembly and in Parliament, was specifically directed. Hence, the omission must have been deliberate.
It is true that a constitution should be interpreted in a broad and generous spirit, but the rule of “plain meaning” or “literal” interpretation could not altogether be abandoned. The object of interpretation is to discover the intention of the law makers, and this object can obviously be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions. A logical corollary of the rule of literal interpretation is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made; and an application of this rule necessarily involves that addition to, or modification of, words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible. Courts may depart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity.
It could be presumed that the omission of the qualification that the representative of graduate should also be a graduate was deliberate. By presuming such an intention of the law makers, no absurdity results.
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