Author: Admin

D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar

• These writ petitions have been filed by four petitioners challenging the practice of the State of Bihar in promulgating and repromulgating ordinances on a massive scale and in particular they have challenged the constitutional validity of three different ordinances issued by the Governor of Bihar, namely, (r) Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance, 1983, (ii) The Bihar Intermediate Education Council Third Ordinance, 1983, and (iii) The Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance, 1983
• Question is, can the Governor go on re-promulgating ordinances for an indefinite period of time and thus take over to himself the power of the Legislature to legislate though that power is conferred on him under Article 213 only for the purpose of enabling him to take immediate action at a time when the legislative assembly of the State is not in session or when in a case where there is a legislative council in the State, both Houses of Legislature are not in session
• The object of this provision is that since the power conferred on the Governor to issue Ordinances is an emergent power exercisable when the Legislature is not in Session, an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor to deal with a situation which requires immediate action and which cannot wait until the legislature reassembles, must necessarily have a limited life. Since Article 174 enjoins that the Legislature shall meet at least twice in a year but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next Session and an Ordinance made by the Governor must cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, it is obvious that the maximum life of an Ordinance cannot exceed seven and a half months unless it is replaced by an Act of the Legislature or disapproved by the resolution of the Legislature before the expiry of that period. The power to promulgate an Ordinance is essentially a power to be used to meet an extra-ordinary situation and it cannot be allowed to be perverted to serve political ends.
• The law-making function is entrusted by the Constitution to the Legislature consisting of the representatives of the people and if the Executive were permitted to continue the provisions of an Ordinance in force by adopting the methodology of repromulgation without submitting to the voice of the Legislature, it would be nothing short of usurpation by the Executive of the law- making function of the Legislature. The Executive cannot by taking resort to an emergency power exercisable by it only when the Legislature is not in Session, take over the            law- making function of the Legislature. That would   be clearly subverting the democratic process which lies at the core of our constitutional scheme…The Government cannot by-pass the Legislature and without enacting the provisions of the Ordinance into an Act of the Legislature, repromulgate the Ordinance as soon as the Legislature is prorogued.
• Of course, there may be a situation where it may not be possible for the Government to introduce and push through in the Legislature a Bill containing the same provisions as in the Ordinance, because the Legislature may have too much legislative business in a particular Session or the time at the disposal of the Legislature in a particular Session may be short, and in that event, the Governor may legitimately find that it is necessary to repromulgate the Ordinance. Where such is the case, re-promulgation of the Ordinance may not be open to attack. But otherwise, it would be a colourable exercise of power on the part of the Executive to continue an Ordinance with substantially the same provisions beyond the period limited by the Constitution, by adopting the methodology of repromulgation…We must accordingly strike down the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Ordinance, 1983 which is still in opera- tion as unconstitutional and void.

AK Roy v. Union of India

• CHANDRACHUD, C.J. This is a group of Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the National Security ordinance, 2 of 1980, and certain provisions of the National Security Act, 65 of 1980, which replaced the ordinance. Writ Petition No. 5724 of 1980 is by Shri A. K. Roy, a Marxist member of the Parliament, who was detained under the ordinance by an order passed by the District Magistrate, Dhanbad, on the ground that he was indulging in activities which were prejudicial to public order. Ten members of the Parliament, one an Independent and the others belonging to various political parties in opposition applied for permission to intervene in the Writ Petition on the ground that since the ordinance-making power of the President is destructive of the system of Parliamentary democracy, it is necessary to define the scope of that power. We allowed the intervention…The National Security ordinance, 1980, was passed in order “to provide for preventive detention in certain cases end for matters connected therewith”…The Parliament was not      in session when it was promulgated and its preamble recites that it was being issued because the “President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action”
• …while setting out the petitioner s case, the thrust of his argument is that the power to issue an ordinance is Dan executive power, not a legislative power, and consequently, is not law. In view of the clear and specific provisions of the Constitution bearing upon this question, it is quite impossible to accept this argument. The heading of Chapter III of Part V is “Legislative Powers of the President”. Clause (2) of Article 123 provides that an ordinance promulgated under Article 123 “shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament”. The only obligation on the Government is to lay the ordinance before both Houses of Parliament and the only distinction which the Constitution makes between a law made by the Parliament and an ordinance issued by the President is that whereas the life of a law made by the Parliament would depend upon the terms of that law, an ordinance, by reason of sub clause (a) of clause (2), ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, unless resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses before the expiration of that period.
• It is clear from this provision, if indeed there was any doubt about the true position, that the Constitution makes no distinction in principle between a law made by the legislature and an ordinance issued by the President. Both, equally, are products of the exercise of legislative power and, therefore, both are equally subject to the limitations which the Constitution has placed upon that power. It may sound strange at first blush that the executive should possess legislative powers, but a careful look at our Constitution will show that the scheme adopted by it envisages the exercise of legislative powers by the executive in stated circumstances. An ordinance can be issued by the President provided that both Houses of the Parliament are not in session and the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render It necessary for him to take immediate action An ordinance which satisfies these pre-conditions has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament.

R.K. Garg. v. Union of India

• These writ petitions raise a common question of law relating to the constitutional validity of the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Ordinance, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance)…we may now proceed to consider the challenge against the constitutional validity of the Ordinance on the ground that the President had no power to issue the Ordinance under Article 123 of the Constitution. There were two limbs of the argument under this head of challenge; one was that since the Ordinance had the effect of amending the tax laws, it was outside the competence of the President under Article 123 and the other was that the subject matter of the Ordinance was in the nature of a Money Bill which could be introduced only in the House of the People and passed according to the procedure provided in Articles 109 and 110 and the President had therefore no power under Article 123 to issue the Ordinance by-passing the special procedure provided in Articles 109 and 110 for the passing of a Money Bill. There is, as we shall presently point out, no force in either of these two contentions, but we may point out straightaway that both these contentions are academic, since the Act has been brought into force with effect from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance
• It may be noted, and this was pointed out forcibly by Dr. Ambedkar while replying to the criticism against the introduction of Article 123 in the Constituent Assembly-that the legislative power conferred on the President under this Article is not a parallel power of legislation. It is a power exercisable only when both Houses of Parliament are not in session and it has been conferred ex-necessitate in order to enable the executive to meet an emergent situation. Moreover, the law made by the President by issuing an Ordinance is of strictly limited duration. It ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament or if before the expiration of this period, resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions. This also affords the clearest indication that the President is invested with this legislative power only in order to enable the executive to tide over an emergent situation which may arise whilst the Houses of Parliament are not in session. Further more, this power to promulgate an Ordinance conferred on the President is co-extensive with the power of Parliament to make laws and the President cannot issue an Ordinance which Parliament cannot enact into a law. It will therefore be seen that legislative power has been conferred on the executive by the Constitution makers for a necessary purpose and it is hedged in by limitations and conditions. The conferment of such power may appear to be undemocratic but it is not so, because the executive is clearly answerable to the legislature and if the President, on the aid and advice of the executive, promulgates an Ordinance in misuse or abuse of this power, the legislature cannot only pass a resolution disapproving the Ordinance but can also pass a vote of no confidence in the executive.

Now once it is accepted that the President has legislative power under Article 123 to promulgate an ordinance and this legislative power is co-extensive with the power of the Parliament to make laws, it is difficult to see how any limitation can be read into this legislative power of the President so as to make it ineffective to alter or amend tax laws. If Parliament can by enacting legislation alter or amend tax laws, equally can the President do so by issuing an Ordinance under Article 123. There have been, in fact, numerous instances where the President has issued an Ordinance replacing with retrospective effect a tax law declared void by the High Court or this Court. Even offences have been created by Ordinance issued by the President under Article 123 and such offences committed during the life of the Ordinance have been held to be punishable despite the expiry of the Ordinance.

You can grab notes on other provisions of the Constitution and other law subjects from here.

B. R. Kapoor v. State Of Tamil Nadu

• Jayalalithaa, was convicted in two criminal cases by the trial court. On appeal, High Court suspended her sentences but her application for stay of judgment was rejected. She then contested elections and her nomination was rejected due to criminal convictions. Her party came into the majority and she became the Chief Minister. This was challenged in appeal.
• Har Sharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh,Chief Minister, U.P. – Person was not a member of either house of legislature of the state and was made Chief minister. Court held that Article 164(1) does not provide any qualification for person to be selected as Chief Minister. Accordingly, court held that it sees no reason as to why 164(4) be restricted to only cases where a Minister loses for some reaso11 his seat in the Legislature of the State.
• Har Sharan Verma Union of India – Court considered the question in the context of membership of Parliament and Article 75(5), which is similar in terms to Article 164( 4). The Court said that a person who was not a member of either House of Parliament could be a Minister for not more than· six months; though lie would not have any right to vote, he would be entitled, by virtue of Article 88, to participate in the proceedings of Parliament.
• P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda – parity of reasoning if a person who is not a member of the State Legislature can be appointed a Chief Minister of a State under Article 164(4) for six months, a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament can be appointed Prime Minister for the same duration.
• R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab – Using Article 164(4) same person was being made minister again and again during the same term without fighting the election which was not allowed by the court.
• To answer the question before us, three sub-Articles of Article 164 need, in our view, to be read together, namely, sub-Articles (1),(2) and (4)…Necessarily implicit in sub-Article (4) read with sub- Articles (1) and (2) is the requirement that a Minister who is not a member of the legislature must seek election to the legislature and, in the event of his failing to secure a seat in the legislature within six months, he must cease to be a Minister. The requirement of sub- Article (4) being such, it follows as the night the day that a person who is appointed a Minister though he is not a member of the legislature shall be one who can stand for election to the legislature and satisfy the requirement of sub-Article (4). In other words, he must be one who satisfies the qualifications for membership of the legislature contained in the Constitution (Article 173) and is not disqualified from seeking that membership by reason of any of the provisions therein (Article 191) on the date of his appointment

Re Gujarat Assembly Election Matter

• The dissolved Legislative Assembly of the State of Gujarat was constituted in March 1998 and its five-year term was to expire on 18.3.2003. On 19.7.2002 on the advice of the Chief Minister, the Governor of Gujarat dissolved the Legislative Assembly. The last sitting of the dissolved Legislative Assembly was held on 3rd April 2002. Immediately after dissolution of the Assembly, the Election Commission of India took steps for holding fresh elections for constituting the new Legislative Assembly. However, the Election Commission by its order dated 16th August, 2002 while acknowledging that Article 174(1) is mandatory and applicable to an Assembly which is dissolved and further that the elections for constituting new Legislative Assembly must be held within six months of the last session of the dissolved Assembly, was of the view that it was not in a position to a conduct elections before 3rd of October, 2002 which was the last date of expiry of six months from last sitting of the dissolved Legislative Assembly. It is in this context the President of India in exercise of powers conferred upon him by virtue of Clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India referred three questions for the opinion of the Supreme Court by this order dated 19th August, 2002 which run as under…
• the first question that arises for consideration is whether Article 174(1) is applicable to a dissolved Assembly?… A plain reading of Article 174 shows that it stipulates that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. It does not provide for any period of limitation for holding fresh election in the event a Legislative Assembly is prematurely dissolved. It is true that after commencement of the Constitution, the practice has been that whenever either Parliament or Legislative Assembly were prematurely dissolved, the election for constituting fresh Assembly or Parliament, as the case may be, were held within six months from the date of the last sitting of the dissolved Parliament or Assembly…Article 174 deals with a live legislature. The purpose and object of the said provision is to ensure that an existing legislature meets at least every six months, as it is only an existing legislature that can be prorogued or dissolved.
• Holding:-
• Article 174(1) of the Constitution relates to an existing, live and functional Legislative Assembly and not to a dissolved Assembly.
• The provision in Article 174(1) that six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its sitting in the next session is mandatory and relates to the frequencies of the sessions of a live and existing Legislative Assembly and does not provide for any period of limitation for holding fresh elections for constituting Legislative Assembly on premature dissolution of the Assembly.
• The expressions “the House”, “either House” is synonymous with Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council and they do not refer to different bodies other than the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council, as the case may be.
• Neither under the Constitution nor under the Representation of the People Act, any period of limitation has been prescribed for holding election for constituting Legislative Assembly after premature dissolution of the existing one. However, in view of the scheme of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, the elections should be held within six months for constituting Legislative Assembly from the date of dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.
• Under the Constitution, the power to frame the calendar or schedule for elections for constituting Legislative Assembly is within the exclusive domain of the Election Commission and such a power is not subject to any law either made by Parliament or State Legislature.

You can grab notes on other provisions of the Constitution and other law subjects from here.

Union and State Executive

Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State Of Punjab

Writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, was filed by six persons who carried on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books for different classes in the schools of Punjab, particularly for the primary and middle classes, under the name and style “Uttar Chand Kapur & Sons”, It was alleged that the Education Department of the Punjab Government pursuant to their “so-called policy of nationalisation of text books”, issued a series of notifications since 1950 regarding the printing, publication and sale of these books which not only placed unwarranted restrictions upon the rights of the petitioners to carry on their business but also practically ousted them and other traders from the business altogether and this was a violation of their fundamental under Article 19(1)(g), It was contended that the restrictions were being imposed without the authority of law and therefore not saved by clause (6) of Article 19.

Mukherjea, C.J. –

Petitioner’s Contentions:-

Contention 1 – The executive Government of a State is wholly incompetent, without any legislative sanction, lo engage in any trade or business activity and that the acts of the Government in carrying out their policy of establishing monopoly in the business of printing and publishing text books for school students is wholly without jurisdiction and illegal

Contention 2 -assuming that the State could create a monopoly in its favour in respect of a particular trade or business, that could be done not by any executive act but by means of a proper legislation which should conform to the requirements of Article 19(6) of the Constitution

Contention 3 – it was not open to the Government lo deprive the petitioners of their interest in any business or undertaking which amounts to property without authority of law and without payment of compensation as is required under Article 31 of the Constitution

Contention 1 – Constitution clearly recognises a division of governmental functions into three categories viz, the legislative, the judicial and the executive, the function of the executive cannot but be to execute the laws passed by the legislature or to supervise the enforcement of the same. The legislature must first enact a measure which the executive can then carry out. (Used Article 73 & 162 and Australian Case)

Court’s reasoning – Article 73 provides that the executive powers of the Union shall extend to matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws and to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or any agreement.

Article 73 & 162 does not contain any definition as to what the executive function is and what activities would legitimately come within its scope. They are concerned primarily with the distribution of the executive power between the Union on the one hand and the States on the other. They do not mean, as petitioner seems to suggest, that it is only when Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items appertaining to their respective lists that the Union or the State executive, as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect to them. On the other hand, the language of Article 172 clearly indicates that the powers of the State executive do extend to matters upon which the State Legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been passed already. The same principle underlies Article 73 of the Constitution.

One Australian case discarded on the basis that the provision upon which it was based was not present in Indian constitution.

Motilal v. Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh – The point canvassed there was whether the Government of a State has power under the Constitution to carry on the trade or business of running a bus service in the absence of a legislative enactment authorising the State Government to do so. Chief Justice Malik was of opinion that in a written Constitution like ours the executive power may be such as is given lo the executive or is implied, ancillary or inherent. It must include all powers that may be needed to carry into effect the aims and objects of the Constitution. It must mean more than merely executing the laws. According to the Chief Justice the State has a right to hold and manage its own property and carry on such trade or business as a citizen has the right to carry on, so long as such activity does not encroach upon the rights of others or is not contrary lo law. An act would be within the executive power of the State if it is not an act which has been assigned by the Constitution of India to other authorities or bodies and is not contrary to the provisions of any law and does not encroach upon the legal rights of any member of the public.

Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State.

The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a majority in the legislature concentrates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the Ministers constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the principle of collective responsibility, the most important questions of policy are all formulated by them. Suppose now that the Ministry or the executive Government of a State formulates a particular policy in furtherance of which they want to start a trade or business. Is it necessary that there must be a specific legislation legalising such trade activities before they could be embarked upon? We cannot say that such legislation is always necessary. If the trade or business involves expenditure of funds, it is certainly required that Parliament should authorise such expenditure either directly or under the provisions of a statute. What is generally done in such cases is, that the sums required for carrying on the business are entered in the annual financial statement which the Ministry has to lay before the house or houses of legislature in respect of every financial year under Article 202 of the Constitution. So much of the estimates as relate to expenditure other than those charged on the consolidated fund are submitted in the form of demands for grants to the legislature and the legislature has the power to assent or refuse to assent to any such demand or assent to a demand subject to reduction of the amount (Article 203). After the grant is sanctioned, rule appropriation bill is introduced to provide for the appropriation out of the consolidated fund of the State of all moneys required to meet the grants thus made by the assembly (Article 204). As soon as the appropriation Act is passed, the expenditure made under the heads covered by it would be deemed to be properly authorised by law under Article 266(3) of the Constitution.

It is true that the appropriation Acts cannot be said to give a direct legislative sanction to the trade activities themselves. But so long as the trade activities are carried on in pursuance of the policy which the executive Government has formulated with the tacit support of the majority in the legislature, no objection on the score of their not being sanctioned by specific legislative provision can possibly be raised. Objections could be raised only in regard to the expenditure of public funds for carrying on of the trade or business and to these the appropriation Acts would afford a complete answer. Specific legislation may indeed be necessary if the Government require certain powers in addition to what they possess under ordinary law in order’ to carry on the particular trade or business. Thus when it is necessary to encroach upon private. rights in order to enable the Government to carry on their business, a specific legislation sanctioning such course would have to be passed.

Petitioner’s fundamental rights are not violated as there is a no fundamental right in the publishers that any of the books printed and published by them should be prescribed as text books by the school authorities. So the utmost that could be said is that there was merely a chance or prospect of any or some of their books being approved as text books by the Government. Such chances are incidental to all trades and businesses and there is no fundamental right guaranteeing them. Petitioner’s right to publish books is not taken away and since there is no fundamental right to be approved by the government or be prescribed in schools, there is no violation of any fundamental right.

S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda

H.D. Deve Gowda, not being a member of either House of Parliament, was appointed as the Prime Minister of India. The petitioner contended that he was not eligible to be appointed as the Prime Minister of India and President of India committed a grave and serious constitutional error in swearing him in as the Prime Minister. This action of the President according to the petitioner, was violative of Articles 14, 21 and 75 of the Constitution and, therefore, void ab initio and deserved to be quashed by an appropriate writ, which may be issued under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Har Sharan Verma v. Tribltuvan Narain Singh, Chief Minister, U.P. – Interpreting the said clause in the context of Article 163 and other clauses of Article 164, this Court held that clause 4 of Article 164 had an ancient lineage and there was no reason to whittle down the plain thrust of the said provision by confining it to cases where a person being a member of the legislature and a Minister, for some reason, loses his seat in the State. The Court, therefore, on a combined reading of the aforesaid two provisions held that a person not being a member of either House of Parliament can be appointed a Minister up to a period of six months.

When we compare Articles 74 and 75 with Articles 163 and 164, the first point of difference is that while the former deal with the President and the Prime Minister, the latter deal with the Governor and the Chief Minister. Article 74(1) and Article 163(1) are substantially the same except that the sentence beginning with ‘except’ and ending with ‘discretion’, special to the Governor’s function, is not to be found in Article 74(1). The proviso to Article 74(1) which grants a special privilege to the President is not to be found in Article 163(1) whereas clause (2) of Article 163 is not to be found in Article 74. Clause (2) to Article 163 is a corollary to the exception clause in Article 163( l) and has no relevance to the issue on hand. Article 74(2) and Article 163(3) are verbatim.

Articles 75(1) and 75(2) are identical to Article 164(1) except that in the case of the latter, the two clauses have been combined into one. The proviso to Article 164(1) which is special to States, is not to be found in Article 75. The rest of the clauses of the two articles are identical except for consequential changes.

On a plain reading of Article 75(5) it is obvious that the Constitution-makers desired to permit a person who was not a member of either House of Parliament to be appointed a Minister for a period of six consecutive months and if during the said period he was not elected to either House of Parliament, he would cease to be a Minister. This becomes clear if one were to read the debates of the Constituent Assembly (the draft Articles were 62 and 144 for the present Articles 75 and 164). Precisely on the ground that permitting such persons to be appointed Ministers at the Union or State levels would “cut at the very root of democracy”, an amendment was moved to provide: “No person should be appointed a Minister unless at the time of his appointment, he is elected member of the House:” which amendment was spurned by Dr. Ambedkar

The Council of Ministers is made collectively responsible to the House of the People. The form of the oath prescribed in the Third Schedule under Article 75( 4) is the same for the Prime Minister as well as a Minister. In other words, the Constitution does not draw any distinction between the Prime Minister and any .other Minister in this behalf. This is not to say that the Prime Minister does not enjoy a special status; he does as the head of the Council of Ministers but the responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the House of the People is collective. Besides, the caption of Article 75 as a whole is “Other provisions as to Ministers”. No separate provision is to be found dealing with the appointment of the Prime Minister as such. Therefore, even though the Prime Minister is appointed by the President after he is chosen by such number of members of the House of the People as would ensure that he has the confidence of the House and would be able to command the support of the majority, and the Ministers are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, the entire Council of Ministers is made collectively responsible to the House and that ensures the smooth functioning of the democratic machinery.

U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi

During dissolution of the House of the People, there can be no Prime Minister The appellant contended that under the Constitution as soon as the House of the People was dissolved under Article 85(2), the Council of Ministers, i.e. the Prime Minister and other Ministers, ceased to hold office. This argument was based on the wording of Article 75(3), which provides that “the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People”. How can the Council .of Ministers be responsible to the House of the People when it has been dissolved under Article 85(2)? It was contended that it was not void in the carrying out of Governmental function will be created because the President can exercise the executive power of the Union either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with Article 53(1) of the Constitution

It will be noticed that Article 74(1) is mandatory in form. We are unable to agree with the appellant that in the context the word ‘shall’ should be read as ‘may’. Article 52 is mandatory. In other words “there shall be a President of India’. So is Article 74(1). The Constituent Assembly did not choose the Presidential system of Government. If we were to give effect to this contention of the appellant we would be changing the whole concept of the Executive. It would mean that the President need not have a Prime Minister and Ministers to aid and advise in the exercise of his functions. As there would be no ‘Council of Ministers, nobody would be responsible to the House of the People. With the aid of advisers he would be able to rule the country at least till he is impeached under Article 61.

Now comes the crucial clause three of Article 75. The appellant urges that the House of People having been dissolved this clause cannot be complied with. According to him it follows from the provisions of this clause that it is was contemplated that on the dissolution of the House of People the Prime Minister and the other ministers must resign or be dismissed by the President and the President must carry on the Government .as best as he can with the aid of the Services. As we have shown above. Article 74(1) is mandatory and, therefore, the President cannot exercise the executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers We must then harmonise the provisions of Article 75(3) with Article 74(1) and Article 75(2). Article 75(3) brings into existence what is usually ·called “Responsible Government”. In other words the Council of Ministers must enjoy the confidence of the House of People. While the House of People is not dissolved under Article 85(2)(a), Article 75(3) has full operation. But when it is dissolved the Council of Ministers cannot naturally enjoy the confidence of the House of People. Nobody has said that the Council of Ministers does not enjoy the confidence of the House of People when it is prorogued. In the context, therefore, this clause must be read as meaning that Article 75(3) only applies when the House of People does not stand dissolved or prorogued. We are not concerned with the case where dissolution of the House of People takes place under Article 83(2) on the expiration of the period of five years prescribed therein, for Parliament has provided for that contingency in Section 14 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951.

Shamsher Singh v. State Of Punjab

Two freshers in the State Judiciary (the appellants), were on probation. Before the expiry of the period, the High Court having discovered unsavoury conduct of the appellants, as controlling authority, considered it fit to terminate their services on grounds of unsuitability. The Council of Ministers, on a consideration of the High Court’s report, acted on it and ended the probation of the appellants, although the Governor’s personal satisfaction about this step was neither sought nor secured. TI1e orders terminating probation were challenged primarily on the ground that the power of appointment being with the Governor (or the President, in the case of Central Services), the removal must be by him alone. Wherever the Constitution vests power in the Governor or President, it has to be exercised by him, applying his own mind to the materials. He can neither surrender the power to his Ministers nor delegate to his officers

First, there are several constitutional functions, powers and duties of the Governor. These are conferred on him eo nomine the Governor. The Governor, is, by and under the Constitution, required to act in his discretion in several matters. These constitutional functions and powers of the Governor eo nonmine as well as these in the discretion of the Governor are not executive powers of the State within the meaning of Article 154 read with Article 162.

Second, the Governor under Article 163 of the Constitution can take aid and advice of his Council of Ministers when he is exercising executive power of the State. The Governor can exercise powers and functions without the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers when he is required by or under the Constitution to act in his discretion, where he is required to exercise his constitutional functions conferred on him eo nomine as the Governor.

Third, the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 163 is different from the allocation of business of the government of the State by the Governor to the Council of Ministers under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. The allocation of business of government under Article 166(3) is an instance of exercise of executive power by the Governor through his Council by allocating or delegating his functions. The aid and advice is a constitutional restriction on the exercise of executive powers of the State by the Governor. The Governor will not be constitutionally competent to exercise these executive powers of the State without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Fourth, the executive powers of the State are vested in the Governor under Article 154(1). The powers of appointment and removal of Subordinate Judges under Article 234 have not been allocated to the Ministers under the Rules of Business of the State of Punjab. Rule 18 of the Rules of Business states that except as otherwise provided by any other rule cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister-in-charge who may, by means of Standing Orders, give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in his department. Rule 7(2) in Part D of the Punjab Civil Service Rules which states that the Governor of Punjab may on the recommendation of the High Court remove from service without assigning any cause any Subordinate Judge-or revert him to his substantive post during the period of probation is incapable of allocation to a Minister. Rule 18 of the Rules of Business is subject to exceptions and Rule 7(2) of the Service Rules is such an exception. Therefore, the appellants contend that the power of the Governor to remove Subordinate Judges wider Article 234 read with the aforesaid Rule 7(2) of the Service Rules cannot be allocated to a Minister.

It is noticeable that though in Article 74 it is stated that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of is functions, there is no provision in Article 74 comparable to Article I 63 ·that the aid and advice is except in so far as he is required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. It is necessary to find out as to why the words ‘in his discretion’ are used in relation to some powers of the Governor and not in the case of the President.

State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadltya held that the power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure, subject to the provisions of Article 311, is not an executive power under Article 154 but a constitutional power and is not capable of being delegated to officers subordinate to him. The Governor could not delegate his pleasure to any officer nor could any law provide for the exercise of that pleasure by an officer with the result that statutory rules governing dismissal were binding on every officer though they were subject to the overriding pleasure of the Governor. This would mean that the officer was bound by the rules but the Governor was not.

Moti Ram Deka ‘s case and this Court restated that proposition No. 2 must be read along with the subsequent propositions specified as propositions Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6. The ruling in Moti Ram Deka’s case is that a law can be framed prescribing the procedure by which and the authority by whom the said pleasure can be exercised. The pleasure of the President or the Governor to dismiss can therefore not only be delegated but is also subject to Article 311. The true position as laid down in Moti Ram Deka ‘s case is that Articles 310 and 311 must no doubt be read together but once the true scope and effect of Article 311 is determined the scope of Article 310(1) must be limited in the sense that in regard to cases falling under Article 311 (2) the pleasure mentioned in Article 310(2) must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of Article 311.

The majority view in Babu Ram Upadltya’s case is no longer good law after the decision in Moti Ram Deka’s case

In making a report under Article 356 the Governor will be justified in exercising his discretion even against the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. The reason is that the failure of the constitutional machinery may be because of the conduct of the Council of Ministers. This discretionary power is given to the Governor to enable him to report to the President who, however, must act on the advice of his Council of Ministers in all matters. In this context Article 163(2) is explicable that the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and the validity shall not be called in question. The action taken by the President on such a report is a different matter. The President acts on the advice of his Council of Ministers. In all other matters where the Governor acts in his discretion he will act in harmony with his Council of Ministers. The Constitution does not aim at providing a parallel administration within the State by allowing the Governor to go against the advice of the Council of Ministers.

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President as well as the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in executive action and is not required by the Constitution to act personally without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Where the Governor has any discretion the Governor acts on his own judgment. The Governor exercises his discretion in harmony with his Council of Ministers. The appointment as well as removal of the members of the Subordinate Judicial Service is an executive action of the Governor to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions, of the Constitution. Appointments and removals of persons are made by the President and the Governor as the constitutional head of the Executive on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. That is why any action by any servant of the Union or the State in regard to appointment or dismissal is brought against the Union or the State and not against the President or the Governor.

You can grab notes on other provisions of the Constitution and other law subjects from here.

In Re Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves

An agreement was entered between India and Pakistan to resolve the boundary dispute. Certain questions of law emerged with regard to implementation of agreement and President of India, in exercise of the powers under Article 143( I) of the Constitution, referred three questions to the Supreme Court for its advice:

Is any legislative action necessary for the implementation of the Agreement relating to Berubari Union?

If so, is a law of Parliament relatable to Article 3 of the Constitution sufficient for the purpose or is an a1nend1nent of the Constitution in accordance with Artic1e 368 of the Constitution necessary, in addition or in the alternative?

Is a law of Parliament relatable to Article 3 of the Constitution sufficient for implementation of the agreement relating to Exchange of Enclaves or is an amendment of the Constitution in accordance with Article 368 of the Constitution necessary for the purpose, in addition or ill the alternative?

Attorney General contended that the said Agreement is merely the recognition or ascertainment of the boundary which had already been fixed and in no sense is it a substitution of a new boundary or the alteration of the boundary implying any alteration of the territorial limits of India. He emphasises that the ascertainment or the settlement of the boundary in the light of the award by which both Governments were bound, is not an alienation or cession of the territory of India, and according to him, if, as a result of the ascertainment of the true boundary in the light of the award, possession of some land has had to be yielded to Pakistan it does not amount to cession of territory; it is merely a mode of settling the boundary.

In view of this factual position there should be no difficulty in holding that it falls within the territories which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were comprised in the Province of West Bengal. Therefore, as a result of the implementation of this Agreement the boundaries of West Bengal would be altered and the content of Entry 13 in the First Schedule to the Constitution would be affected.

Mr. Chaterjee raises contention that Parliament has no power to cede territory and agreement must be declared void as:-

Framers were determined to keep the entire territory of India as inviolable and sacred. The very first sentence in the preamble, which declares that “We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic”, says Mr Chatterjee, irrevocably postulates that India geographically and territorially must always continue to be democratic and republican.

it is argued that whereas the Constitution has expressly given to the country the power to acquire other territories it has made no provision for ceding any part of its territory; and in such a case the rule of construction viz. expressio unius est exclusio alterius must apply.

Court held that the preamble is not a part of the Constitution, and, “it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Govenm1ent of the United States, or on any of its departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution and such as may be implied from those so granted”.

On a true construction of Article 1(3) (c) it is erroneous to assume that it confers specific powers to acquire foreign territories.

There can be no doubt that a sovereign State can exercise its right to cede a part of its territory to a foreign State.

In the Indian Constitution, the emphasis on the preservation of the territorial integrity of the constituent States is absent.

It may, therefore, be assumed that in construing Article 3 we should take into account the fact that the Constitution contemplated changes of the territorial limits of the constituent States and there was no guarantee about their territorial integrity.

The acquisition of foreign territory by India in exercise of its inherent right as a sovereign State automatically makes the said territory a part of the territory of India. After such territory is thus acquired and factually made a part of the territory of India the process of law may assimilate it either under Article 2 or under Article 3(a) or (b).

Can Parliament legislate in regard to the agreement under Article 3? Broadly stated Article 3 deals with the internal adjustment inter se of the territories of the constituent States of India. Article 3(a) enables Parliament to form a new State and this can be done either by the separation of the territory from any State, or by uniting two or more States or parts of States, or by uniting any territory to a part of any State. There can be no doubt that foreign territory which after acquisition becomes a part of the territory of India under Article 1(3) (c) is included in the last clause of Article 3(a) and that such territory may, after its acquisition, be absorbed in the new State which may be formed under Article 3(a). Thus Article 3(a) deals with the problem of the formation of a new State and indicates the modes by which a new State can be formed.

Article 3(c) deals with the problem of the diminution of the area of any State. Such · diminution may occur, where the part of the area of a State is taken out and added to another · State, and in that sense Articles 3(b) and 3(c) may in some cases be said to be correlated; but does Article 3(c) refer to a case where a part of the area of a State is taken out of that State and is not added to any other -State but is handed over to a foreign State? If the power to acquire foreign territory which is an essential attribute of sovereignty is not expressly conferred by the Constitution there is no reason why the power to cede a part of the national territory which is also an essential attribute of sovereignty should have been provided for by the Constitution. Both of these essential attributes of sovereignty are outside the Constitution and can be exercised by India as a sovereign State. Therefore, even if Article 3(c) receives the widest interpretation it would be difficult to accept the argument that it covers a case of cession of a part of national territory in favour of a foreign State. The diminution of the area of any State to which it refers postulates that the area diminished from the State in question should and must continue to be a part of the territory of India; it may increase the. area of any other State or may be dealt with in any other manner authorised either by Ai1icle 3 or other relevant provisions of the Constitution, but it would not cease to be a part of the territory of India. It would be unduly straining the language of Article 3(c) to hold that by implication it provides for cases of cession of a part of national territory. Therefore, we feel no hesitation in holding that the power to cede national territory cannot be read in Article 3(c) by implication.

It would not be competent to Parliament to make a law relatable to Article 3 of the Constitution for the purpose of implementing the Agreement. This· conclusion must inevitably mean that the law necessary to implement the Agreement has to be passed under Article 368.

The Agreement amounts to a cession of a part of the territory of India in favour of Pakistan; and so its implementation would naturally involve the alteration of the content of and the consequent amendment of Article I and of the relevant part of the First Schedule to the Constitution, because such implementation would necessarily lead to the diminution of the territory of the Union of India. Such an amendment can be made under Article 368. Parliament may, however, if it so chooses, pass a law amending Article 3 of the Constitution so as to cover cases of cession of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State.

You can grab notes on other provisions of the Constitution and other law subjects from here.

Federalism

SR Bommai v. Union of India (Federalism)

The court examined issues such as the nature of Indian Constitution, certain aspects of the Centre-State relations.

Chief Minister, Bommai claimed he had the majority in the house and was willing to prove it on the floor of the house but the President exercised its power under Article 356 of the constitution issued Proclamation dissolving Bommai Government and the Assembly and assumed the administration of the State of Karnataka.

Sri Ram Janmabhoomi-Babjri Masjid Issue

After the demolition of Babri Masjid, UP government resigned and President took control of the state. Violent communal clashes soon followed across India and President dismissed the State Governments and dissolved the Legislative Assemblies of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh and assumed administration of the respective States In all of these states BJP was in power.

A.M. AHMADI –

In order to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation our Founding Fathers appear to have leaned in favour of a strong Centre while distributing the powers and functions between the Centre and the States.

Dicey – Federalism is, therefore, a concept which unites separate States into a Union without sacrificing their own fundamental political integrity, the essence of a federation is the existence of the Union and the States and the distribution of powers between them, Federalism, therefore, essentially implies demarcation of powers in a federal compact.

On a conjoint reading of these articles, it becomes clear that Parliament has the right to form new States, alter the 1ireas of existing States, or the name of any existing State. Thus the Constitution permits changes in the territorial limits of the States and does not guarantee their territorial integrity. Even names can be changed. In doing so, it has not to seek the concurrence of the State whose area, boundary or name is likely to be affected by the proposal.

Post-independence, some of the subjects of common interest were, however, transferred to the Union List, thereby enlarging the powers of the Union to enable speedy and planned economic development of the nation.

States depend for financial assistance upon the Union since their power to raise resources is limited.

Article 368 confers powers on Parliament to amend the Constitution, albeit by a specified majority. The power extends to amending matters pertaining to the executive as well as legislative powers of the States if the amendments are ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States. This provision empowers Parliament.to so amend the Constitution as to curtail the powers of the States. A strong Central Government may not find it difficult to secure the requisite majority as well as ratification by one half of the legislatures if one goes by past experience. These limitations taken together indicate that the Constitution of India cannot be said to be truly federal in character as understood by lawyers in the United States of America.

Under our Constitution the State as such has no inherent sovereign power or autonomous power which cannot be encroached upon by the Centre.

Constitution of India is differently described, more appropriately as ‘quasi-federal’ because it is a mixture of the federal and unitary elements, leaning more towards· the latter but then what is there in a name, what is important to bear in mind is the thrust and implications of the various provisions of the Constitution bearing on the controversy in regard to scope and ambit of the Presidential power under Article 356 and related provisions.

P.B. SAWANT, J. –

Article 1 of the Constitution states that India shall be a Union of States. Thus the States are constitutionally recognised units and not mere convenient administrative divisions.

HM Seervai in defence of federalism:-

It is no objection to our Constitution being federal that the States were not independent States before they became parts of a Federation. A federal situation existed, first, when the British Parliament adopted a federal solution in the G.O.I. Act, 1935, and secondly; when the Constituent Assembly adopted a federal solution in our Constitution;

Parliament’s power to alter the boundaries of States without their consent is a breach of the federal principle, but in fact it is not Parliament which has, on its own, altered the boundaries of States. By extra-constitutional agitation, the States have forced Parliament to alter the boundaries of States. In practice; therefore, the federal principle has not been violated;

The allocation of the residuary power off legislation to Parliament (i.e. the Federation) is irrelevant for determining the federal nature of a Constitution. The U.S. and the Australian Constitutions do not confer the residuary power on the Federation but on the States, yet those Constitutions are indisputably federal;

External sovereignty is not relevant to the federal feature of a Constitution, for such sovereignty must belong to the country as a whole. But the division of internal sovereignty by a distribution of legislative powers is an essential feature of federalism, and our Constitution possesses that feature.

The enactment in Article 352 of the emergency power arising from war or external aggression which threatens the security of India merely recognises de jure what happens de facto in great federal countries like the U.S., Canada and Australia in times of war, or imminent threat of war, because in war, these federal countries act as though they were unitary.

The power to proclaim an emergency originally on the ground of internal disturbance, but now only on the ground of armed rebellion, does not detract from the principle of federalism because such a power, as we have seen exists in indisputably federal constitutions.

The provisions of Article 355 imposing a duty on the Union to protect a State against external aggression and internal disorder are not inconsistent with the federal principle. The war power belongs to the Union in all Federal Governments.

both federal and State laws operate on the same individual, it must follow that in case of conflict of a valid federal law and a valid State law, the federal law must prevail and our Constitution so provides in Article 254.

Our Constitution has adopted the method of empowering the Union Government to give directions to the States to give effect to the Union law and to prevent obstruction in the working of the Union law. Such a power, though different in form, is in substance the same as the power of the Federal Government in the U.S. to enforce its laws, if necessary by force. Therefore, the power to give directions to the State Governments does not violate the federal principle;

Article 356 (read with Article 355) which provides for the failure of constitutional machinery was based on Article 4, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution and Article 356, like Article 4, Section 4, is not inconsistent with the federal principle. As stated earlier, these provisions were meant to be the last resort, but have been gravely abused and can therefore be said to affect the working of the Constitution as a Federal Government. But the recent amendment of Article 356 by the 44th Amendment, and the submission to be made hereafter that the doctrine of the political question does not apply in India, show that the courts can now take a more active part in preventing a mala fide or improper exercise of the power to impose a President’s rule, unfettered by the American doctrine of the political question;

The view that unimpo1tant matters were assigned to the States cannot be sustained in face of the very important subjects assigned to the States in List II, and the same applies to taxing powers of the States, which are made mutually exclusive of the taxing powers of the Union so that ordinarily the States have independent source of revenue of their own. In addition to the exclusive taxing powers of the States, the States become entitled either to appropriate taxes collected by the Union or to’ a share in the taxes collected by the Union.

The fact that during emergency and in certain other eventualities their powers are overridden or invaded by the Centre is not destructive of the essential federal nature of our Constitution. The invasion of power in such circumstances is not a normal feature· of the Constitution. They are exceptions and have to be resorted to only occasionally to meet the exigencies of the special situations. The exceptions are not a rule.

Whatever the bias in favour of the Centre, it cannot be argued that merely because (and assuming it is correct) the Constitution is labelled unitary or qm1si-federal or a mixture of federal and unitary structure, the President has unrestricted power of issuing Proclamation under Article 356(1).

K. RAMASWAMI –

Indian Constitution federalism is not based on any agreement between federating units but one of integrated whole as pleaded with vision by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the floor of the Constituent Assembly at the very inception of the deliberations and the Constituent Assembly unanimously approved the resolution of federal structure.

the organic federalism designed by the Founding Fathers is to suit the parliamentary form of Government to suit the Indian conditions with the objective of promoting mutuality and common purpose rendering social, economic and political justice, equality of status and opportunity; dignity of person to all its citizens transcending regional, religious, sectional or linguistic barriers as complimentary units in working the Constitution without confrontation.

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY –

The fact that under the scheme of our Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-a-vis the States does not mean that States are mere appendages of the Centre. Within the sphere allotted to them, States are supreme. The Centre cannot tamper with their powers. More particularly, the courts should not adopt an approach, an interpretation, which has the effect of or tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved to the States.

Federalism in the Indian Constitution is not a matter of administrative convenience, but one of principle – the outcome of our own historical process and recognition of the ground realities.

State Of West Bengal v. Union of India

The Political sovereignty of India is distributed between the Union of India and the States with greater weightage in favour of the Union.

Characteristics of Federalism:-

A truly federal form of Government envisages a compact or agreement between independent and sovereign units to surrender partially their authority in their common interest and vesting it in a Union and retaining the residue of the authority in the constituent units. Ordinarily each constituent unit has its separate Constitution by which it is governed in all matters except those surrendered to the Union, and the Constitution of, the Union primarily operates upon the administration of the units. Our Constitution was not the result of any such compact or agreement: Units constituting a unitary State which were non-sovereign were transformed by abdication of power into a Union,

Supremacy of the Constitution which cannot be altered except by the component units. Our Constitution is undoubtedly supreme, but it is liable to be altered by the Union Parliament alone and the units have no power to alter it. Distribution of powers between the Union and the regional units each in its sphere coordinate and independent of the other. The basis of such distribution of power is that in matters of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable in the interest of the units authority is entrusted to the Union, and matters of local concern remain with the States.

Supreme authority of the courts to interpret the Constitution and to invalidate action violative of the Constitution. A federal Constitution, by its very nature, consists of checks and balances and must contain provisions for resolving conflicts between the executive and legislative authority of the Union and the regional units. Supreme authority of the courts to interpret the Constitution and to invalidate action violative of the Constitution. A federal Constitution, by its very nature, consists of checks and balances and must contain provisions for resolving conflicts between the executive and legislative authority of the Union and the regional units.

Therefore the power of the Union to legislate in respect of property situate in the States even if the States are regarded qua the Union as Sovereign, remains unrestricted, and the State property is not immune from its operation. Exercising powers under the diverse entries which have been referred to earlier, the Union Parliament could legislate so as to trench upon the rights of the States in the property vested in them. If exclusion of a State property from the purview of Union legislation is regarded as implicit in those entries in List I, it would be difficult if not impossible for the Union Government to carry out its obligations in respect of matters of national importance. No positive interdict against its exercise is perceptible in the Constitution: and the implication of such an interdict assumes a degree of sovereignty in the States of such plenitude as transcends the express legislative power of the Union. The Constitution which makes a division of legislative and executive powers between the Union and the States is not founded on such a postulate, and the concept of superiority of the Union over the States in the manifold aspects already examined negatives it.

You can grab notes on other provisions of the Constitution and other law subjects from here.

• Federalism
  • SR Bommai v. Union of India (Federalism)
  • State Of West Bengal v. Union of India
• Union & Its Territory
  • In Re Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves
• Union and State Executive
  • Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State Of Punjab
  • S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda
  • U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi
  • Shamsher Singh v. State Of Punjab
• Parliament and State Legislature
  • B. R. Kapoor v. State Of Tamil Nadu
  • Re Gujarat Assembly Election Matter
• Ordinances
  • D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar
  • AK Roy v. Union of India
  • R.K. Garg. v. Union of India
• PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
  • In M S M Sharma v S K Sinha (AIR 1959) SC 393( Searchlight Case)
  • P V Narsimha Rao v State ( 1998) 4 SCC 626
  • In re Keshava Singh (1965) The UP Assembly Case
  • Raja Ram Pal v Speaker Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184
• Distribution of Legislative Powers
  • State Of Bihar & Others v. Sm. Charusila Dasi
  • State Of A.P vs National Thermal Power Corpn
  • Plenary and Ancillary Powers of Legislation
  • The doctrine of Harmonious Construction:
  • Gujarat University v. Madholkar
  • Doctrine of Colourable Legislation
  • Doctrine of Pith and Substance
  • State Of Rajasthan vs Shri G. Chawla And Dr. Pohumal
  • The State Of Karnataka & Ors. vs M/S. Drive-In Enterprises
  • Union of India vs. H.S. Dhillon
  • Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs State Of Bihar
  • Tests of Repugnancy (Deep Chand Case)
• RULE OF REPUGNANCY
  • HOECHST PHARMACEUTICALS V STATE OF BIHAR AIR 1983 SC 1019
  • Zaverbhai v State of Bombay (1954)
• RESIDUARY POWER OF LEGISLATION
  • UNION OF INDIA V H S DHILLON (AIR 1972 SC 1061)
• FREEDOM OF TRADE COMMERCE AND INTERCOURSE
  • ATIABARI TEA CO LTD v STATE OF ASSAM, AIR 1961 SC 232
  • AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORT CO v STATE OF RAJASTHAN
  • G K KRISHNAN v STATE OF TAMIL NADU (1975) 1 SCC 375
  • VIDEO ELECTRONICS (PVT) LTD v. STATE OF PUNJAB (1980) 4 SCC 134
  • SRI MAHAVIR OIL MILLS LTD v STATE OF J&K (1996) 11 SCC 39
  • Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana
• Emergency Provisions
  • S R BOMMAI V UNION OF INDIA (1994) (A NINE-JUDGE BENCH DECISION)
  • RAMESHWAR PRASAD V UNION OF INDIA (2005) 7 SCC 625

You can grab notes for other law subjects from here.