Copyright Case Brief – Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v William Hill (Football) Ltd.

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Citation –[1964] 1 W.L.R. 273

Facts:
Since 1951 Williams (respondents), who were well-known bookmakers, had sent their customers each week fixed odds football betting coupons arranged in a certain general form. In 1959 Ladbroke (appellants), who were also bookmakers, started to send out coupons closely resembling the respondents. It appeared that the respondents had not altered the general form of their coupon since 1951. A coupon was a sheet of paper on which’ were printed several lists of forthcoming matches. The respondents’ coupon contained 16 lists, each with an appropriate name. The appellants’ coupon contained 15 lists. The lists offered by the appellants were almost identical with those offered by the respondents in their corresponding lists. What the appellants adopted from the respondents were the types of wagers and to a large extent the arrangement and the heading. The only differences were that the appellants devised new headings and they worked out for themselves the different odds offered in respect of the various kinds of bets which, accordingly, they did not copy. And it was impossible to copy the selections of matches: the selections must be from the matches to take place in the following week, so there would not be time for one bookmaker to copy from .the coupon of another matter which alters every week. The coupons of some 20 other firms in the business were produced at the trial, and, while they have a general similarity, they vary very much in the nature of their lists and the variety of bets offered in respect of many of the lists. It is not disputed that a vast amount of skill, judgment, experience and work has gone into building up the respondents’ coupon.

Procedural History: 
Judgment of Lloyd-Jacob J. given on June 26, 1962, held (inter alia) that the respondents’ claim to copyright in their fixed odds football coupon or coupons failed on a point of law but adjudged that the respondents should recover one half of their agreed or taxed costs. The Court of Appeal held that the respondents were entitled to copyright and granted them an injunction and awarded the respondents the sum of 40s. as damages. This case is an appeal to the order from The Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1) Whether or to what extent copyright attaches to these coupons? In whole or in part?
2) If the coupons are subject to copyright, has enough copying been done to amount to infringement and whether it was proper to look at the several parts of the work separately?

Judgment: 
Copyright Act is not concerned with the “originality of ideas”, but with the expression of thought, and, in the case of ‘ literary work, with the expression of thought in print or writing. The originality which is required relates to “the expression of the thought”. As regards compilation, originality is a matter of degree depending on the amount of skill, judgment or labour that has been involved in making the compilation. The precise amount of knowledge, labour, judgment or literary skill or taste which the author must bestow in order to acquire copyright must in each case be very much a question of degree. Rough practical test is that “what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting”. When all the hard work has been done in deciding upon the wagers to be offered, there still remains the further distinct task, requiring considerable skill, labour and judgment (though of a different kind) in the way in which the chosen wagers are expressed and presented to the eye of the customer. The extent to which the appellants copied from the respondents’ coupon appears to amount to be a very substantial part of the coupon both in quantity and quality. Therefore, there has been an infringement in this case.

Conclusion:This case is important for a better understanding of copyright because it establishes that for a work to be protected under copyright its expression must be original. In order to determine originality you must see the facts of the case and determine if any skill, labour and judgment was used to make the work, or any part of the work. If so, the whole work will be copyright protected and it is no defence to claim that you only copied the parts that didn’t require skill or judgement. Here, respondents’ coupon was a compilation and so an original literary work, the subject of copyright and appellants had reproduced a substantial part of it, therefore breached.

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Copyright Case Brief – CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada

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Citation – [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13
Facts:
The Law Society of Upper Canada (Respondent) has a library offering both custom and self serve photocopy service. CCH Canadian Limited (Appellant) sues for infringement of copyright in 11 specific works and asks for a permanent injunction preventing further copying. Law Society denies the infringement and files a counterclaim to declare that its activities did not infringe the publishers copyrights, by either providing single copy for research purpose or by allowing patrons to avail themselves of the self-service photocopiers.

Procedural History:
The Federal Court trial division and Federal Court of Appeal allowed the publishers claim in part and then the Law society appealed in Supreme Court of Canada.

Issues:
1) Are the publishers’ materials “original works” protected by copyright?
2) Did the Great Library authorize copyright infringement by maintaining self-service photocopiers and copies of the publishers’ works for its patrons’ use?

Judgment:
1) Are the publishers’ materials “original works” protected by copyright? Court held as following.
a) Headnotes – Yes, it is an original work.
Court said that although headnotes are inspired largely by the judgment they are not an identical copy of the reasons. Part of the judgement can be selected and can be arranged according to one’s choice. Making these decisions require the exercise of skill and judgment and the authors need to have knowledge of the subject for the same.

b) Case Summary- Yes, for the same reasons as mentioned above case summary is also an original work therefore covered by copyright.
c) Topical Index- Yes.
It provides a listing of cases with short headings to indicate the main topics covered by the decision and very brief summaries of the decisions. The author has to decide which headings and cases to include and which cases should fall under which headings. These decisions would require the exercise of skill and judgment.

d) Reported Judicial Decisions –  they have copyright over the compilation but not on judicial decisions themselves. The authors have arranged the case summary, case title, case information (the headnotes) and the judicial reasons in a specific manner. The arrangement of these different components requires the exercise of skill and judgment. The judicial reasons in and of themselves, without the headnotes, are not original works in which the publishers could claim copyright.

2) Did the Great Library authorize copyright infringement by maintaining self-service photocopiers and copies of the publishers’ works for its patrons’ use?
No, library did not authorize copyright infringement. For self service photocopiers court said that there was no evidence that the photocopiers had been used in a manner that was not consistent with copyright law. Court noted that a person does not authorize copyright infringement by authorizing the mere use of equipment (such as photocopiers) that could be used to infringe copyright. For copies for patrons court held that not all request were honoured. Secondly, they granted copies to patrons for research work, which was exemption of copyright infringement.

Rationale:For a work to be “original” within, it must be more than a mere copy of another work. At the same time, it need not be creative, in the sense of being novel or unique. What is required to attract copyright protection in the expression of an idea is an exercise of skill and judgment. The exercise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could be characterized as a purely mechanical process, it should include intellectual effort of the author.

Rule: Standard of Review laid in this case – exercise of skill and judgement in the work.

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Copyright Case Brief – Eastern Book Company v. DB Modak

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Citation – (2008) 1 SCC 1
Fact:
Eastern Book Company A (1) and Eastern Publishers Pvt. A (2) are the Appellant (A) who are into publishing law books. The appellant publish law report containing Supreme Court cases by the name of “Supreme Court Cases (SCC)”. The case are procured from the register of the Supreme Court. The judgement are copy edited and several inputs such as font, paragraphing are made so as to make it user friendly. Along with the changes in the judgement, it also has head notes and foot notes which are prepared by the A (3) Surendra Malik. The Respondents(R) have created a software which is published on a CD ROM by the name of Grand Pix and The Law and the R’s have copied the whole module from the SCC on to the CD ROM.

Procedural History: EBC moved to the court before the single bench judge of the Delhi High Court claiming for temporary injunction as the R’s has constituted infringement by copying the copy edited version of the judgement prepared by EBC. The Single Judge Bench did not grant injunction and held that the edited judgement was not copyright and hence there is no infringement. The R conceded that the A had a copyright over the headnote and the footnote and hence agrees to not copy them. Aggrieved by the decision the A moved to Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the court also didn’t grant them temporary injunction and allowed them to sell the CD ROM and held that by making some changed the original judgement it does not change the characteristic of the judgement and hence it doesn’t constitute as original work. The court didn’t accept the A case and hence forth the present decree lie.

Laws Involved: Sections 13, 14 and 52(1)(iv)(q), Copyright Act, 1957

Issues:
1)
What shall be the standard of originality in a derivative work to get copyright protection and what requirement need to be there for its fulfilment?
2) Whether the whole copy-edited version of the judgement will be entitled for copyright or only entitled to some of the inputs made in the judgement?

Holding:
The court gave the decision in the favour of A’s. The court held that for a derivative work to have copyright protection it should show that the derivative work should be more than a just mere copy of the original work and it should have authors own independent skill, labour and capital. The court stated that copyright has nothing to do with literary merit of the work. The court just need to evaluate whether the skill employed is not of trivial or negligible but substantial. The court also held that the R’s should not copy the paragraphs made by the A for its internal referencing and nor should the R’s use the view of the judges regarding their view as to whether they have a dissenting or concurring in the Case.

Rationale:
The court came to this conclusion after taking into account whether the derivative work is original work of the author and whether he has spent independent skill, labour and judgement in preparing it and that it is just not a mere copy of the original work. Secondly the judges have also taken into account that the changes made by the author in the derivative work are of substantial work and is not of trivial nature. Thirdly the judges have applied the principal of “Sweat of the brow” which means that the author deserves to be reward for the skill. Fourthly the court referred to the principle of minimal degree of creativity that states that there should be a minimal level of creativity in the derivative work in deciding the issue whether the copy edited judgement would qualify as original work or not.

Rule:It is derived from this case that even in a derivative work if the author has applied his own skill, labour and judgement then it will be entitled to copyright protection. The court in such cases need not look in the literary merit of the work but just that the some skill is involved. In case where the copy edited version is created then the changed that require a skill or judgement should be considered original work and should be entitled to copyright protection.

Conclusion:
The Court did grant interim relief to the plaintiff-appellants by directing that though the respondent shall be entitled to sell their CD-ROMS with the text of the judgments of the Supreme Court along with their own head notes, editorial notes. It was further directed by the courts that the respondents shall not use the paragraphs made by the appellants in their copyedited version for internal references and their editor’s judgment regarding the opinions expressed by the Judges by using phrases like concurring’, ‘partly dissenting’, etc. on the basis of reported judgments in SCC. The judgment of the High Court was modified to the extent that in addition to the interim relief already granted by the High Court, the above-mentioned additional relief to the appellants was also granted.

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Copyright Case Brief – Nichols v Universal

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Citation – 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)

Facts/Procedural History: Anne Nichols (plaintiff) wrote a play called the “Abie’s Irish Rose.” The play was about an Irish father and a Jewish father whose children married each other in secret because they feared that their fathers would not have approved. The underlying theme of the play was the hatred between the fathers for each other and for the relationship of their children. The animosity between the fathers was based on their religious differences. Eventually, the children had their own children and as a result, the fathers reconciled. Much humor and comedy was followed in the play. After the play had exhausted its Broadway debut, Universal Pictures Corporation (Universal) (the defendant) made a movie called “The Cohens and the Kellys.” The movie was also based on an Irish Catholic and a Jewish family whose children wed. The fathers similarly did not get along, but not due to their differing religions, more on account of the general animosity of the Jewish father, which is to say that only one of the fathers held the story grudge. Also similarly, the children had their own child, and the fathers eventually reconciled. However, in the movie, the grandchild had nothing to do with the reconciliation. The main themes throughout “The Cohens and the Kellys” were family finances and the relationship between wealth, generosity and how honesty brings families together. Religion did not play a role. The plaintiff asserted copyright infringement in the lawsuit based on the premise that defendant used similar story elements. The district court found in favor of Universal. Nichols appealed.

Issue: Whether the defendant’s film (The Cohens and the Kellys) had infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in the play (Abie’s Irish Rose) by using similar elements?

Holding/Judgment: The Appellate Court noted that a work could be a copy of an earlier work even if it didn’t copy the literal text, but the two works needed to be substantially similar. The Court also found that although the play and the movie shared a number of the similar themes and general plots, the similarities general things, universal concepts, and stereotypical characters (stock characters). There was nothing unique to Nichols’ play that was found in Universal’s movie.

Rationale: The court based its decisions on the Scenes å faire doctrine which reasons that copyright does not extent to incidents, character, or settings that are as a practical matter, indispensable or at least industry standard in the behavior/common practice of a given topic. So for example, all police shows are going to have the same stereotypical characters, but those similar characters are no copyright violations.

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Copyright Case Brief – R.G. Anand v. Delux Films

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Citation – (1978) 4 SCC 118: AIR 1978 SC 1613

Facts: The Plaintiff (P) wrote a script for a play of the name “Hum Hindustani” in 1953 and it was enacted in New Delhi theatres in that year. The play was based on the concept of Provincialism, and was well received so P started considering the possibility of filming it. The Defendant (D) approached P in 1954 after an eminent scriptwriter told him about the play when D was considering making a movie on the topic of Provincialism. On hearing the script D told P that he would inform P of his decision upon return to Mumbai. In 1955 D announced the production of a movie called “New Delhi”, after watching the movie, one of the artists in the play told P that it was similar to the play. P wrote to D about his concerns that the movie was a copy of the play, and D told P that the movie was on the topic of Provincialism but it was not based on the play as the play in itself wasn’t enough for a movie and the characters and story treatment, etc. was very different from the play. P read newspaper comments about the movie and then later watched the movie himself and felt that the movie was entirely based on the play. He found that the movie had one character with the same name as in his play. P therefore filed a suit of the infringement of his copyrights.

Procedural history
: The Delhi High Court held that the similarities between the movie and the play were insignificant and although both the copyrightable subject matters were based on provincialism, the stories and portrayal in the movie were completely different from the play. Dissatisfied with the holding, P appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the cinematographic film was colourable imitation/ substantial or material copy of the play?
2. Whether a name of a person in a copyrightable subject matter can also be copyrighted?

Holding
:
1. The Supreme Court held that the movie although based on the same concept, wasn’t a copy of the play. Therefore, there was no copyright infringement by D.
2. The court also held that the name “Subramaniam” which appeared in both the movie and the play wasn’t copyrightable; therefore the use of the name wouldn’t result in copyright infringement.

Rationale: The similarities and coincidences as observed by the court were insignificant and were not sufficient to raise an inference of colourable imitation. The play relied heavily on the idea of provincialism; it did not touch the other aspects of “caste” and “sati” that the movie had explored. The Supreme Court also observed that the three aspects in the film were completely integral to the movie and could not be divorced from each other without affecting the beauty and the continuity of the script. The story in the movie also went beyond the plot represented in the play. The dissimilarities in the between the movie and the play were so material that it was not possible to say that P’s copyright had been infringed.

Rule: The Supreme Court laid down 7 rules, after considering the precedents, to determine if there was a copyright infringement:
1. “There can be no copyright in an idea, subject matter, themes, plots or historical or legendary facts and violation of the copyright in such cases is confined to the form, manner and arrangement and expression of the idea by the author of the copyright work.”
2. “In order to be actionable the copy must be a substantial and material one which at once leads to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of an act of piracy.”
3. “Seeing the reader, spectator or the viewer after having read or seen both the works is clearly of the opinion and gets an unmistakable impression that the subsequent work appears to be a copy of the original.” If the answer is in the positive then it can be concluded that there is a copyright infringement.
4. “Where the theme is the same but is presented and treated differently so that the subsequent work becomes a completely new work, no question of violation of copyright arises.”
5. “If there are also material and broad dissimilarities which negative the intention to copy the original and the coincidences appearing in the two works are clearly incidental no infringement of the copyright comes into existence.”
6. “It must be proved by clear and cogent evidence after applying the various tests laid down by the case laws.”
7. “Although unlike a stage play a film has a much broader prospective, a wider field and a bigger background where the defendants can by introducing a variety of incidents give a colour and complexion different from the manner in which the copyrighted work has expressed the idea. But if the viewer gets a totality of impression that the film is by and large a copy of the original play, violation of the copyright may be said to be proved.”

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Copyright Case Brief – Baker v. Selden

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Citation –  101 U.S. 99 (1879)

Facts: Charles Selden (P), obtained a copyright of the book “Selden’s Condensed Ledger or Book-Keeping Simplified” in 1859 and this book explained a unique and improved system of book-keeping with a distinct arrangement of columns and headings. In 1867, Baker, the defendant, produced another book using a similar system but the arrangement of columns and their headings were different.

Procedural History: A suit was filed against the D for infringing copyrights of Selden’s book as Baker had used a system that resembled the one used in Selden’s work and the lower court ruled in favor of P. The D then appealed to the US Supreme Court.
Issues:
1)
Did the D infringe the copyright?
2) Did Selden have an exclusive right to the use of the system explained in his book?
Holding:
1)
No, the D did not infringe copyright of the book “Selden’s Condensed Ledger or BookKeeping Simplified”.
2) No, Selden did not have an exclusive right to the use of the system explained in his book.
Rationale: The court reasoned that an author can explain the truths of a science or the methods of an art through his book and can obtain a copyright for his work but this copyright is limited to the expression of the method or system and does not extend to the idea or the system itself. If the author wants to protect the system/idea he will have to be granted a patent for his method/idea and protecting an idea under the copyright law would amount to fraud on the public.
Copyright protects the book as a whole and the expression of an idea through that book. The very object of publishing a book is to impart some knowledge to the public and if people were made liable of infringement each time they used the idea described in the book, it would defeat the purpose. Copyright is mainly concerned with publishing and selling rights and does not give the author exclusive rights over an idea alone.
In this case, Baker was not infringing the copyrights of Selden’s book as he borrowed the idea from Selden’s book but expressed it in a different manner by ensuring that the columns and headings to those columns were different.

Rule: Idea-Expression Dichotomy: A copyright can be obtained only over a particular expression of an idea, it does not protect the idea that underlies that expression and this is what limits copyrights and differentiates it from patents. An idea/art/method can be patented whereas the expression of an idea/art/method can be copyrighted.

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Copyright Case Brief – Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company

Citation – 499 U.S. 340, Supreme Court of the United States of America

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Facts: Rural Telephone Service Company is a certified telephonic service provider operating in Kansas. Owing to a state regulation it is subjected to print and issue a telephone directory consisting information about individual subscriber in the white pages and advertisements of subscribers on the yellow pages. Feist Publication is a publication company which specializes in area-wide telephone directories. Unlike a typical directory, which covers a specific area, Feist publishes a directory which covers a much larger geographical area. Rural Inc. is the sole provider of telephone services in that particular area in Kansas, it obtains the information for the directory quite easily. However, Feist just being a publication house lacks independent access to any subscriber information therefore approaches individual telephone service provider companies for information. 10 out of 11 companies shared the information such that Feist could publish it in their respective directory but Rural Inc. trying to attract the subscribers in its area for yellow page advertisements did not. Despite being denied the information of the subscribers in that particular region of Kansas, Feist Publication went ahead and used the white pages listing of Rural’s directory without their consent but added additional information such as address which was not present in the Rural’s version. Due to the presence of 4 fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to detect copying, Feist was sued by them for copyright infringement.
Procedural History: Rural Inc. sued Feist Publication for copyright infringement in the District Court for the District of Kansas stating that Feist’s employees were obliged to travel door-to door or conduct a telephone survey to discover the information which they had copied. District Court granted a summary judgment to Rural, explaining that “courts have consistently held that telephone directories are copyrightable”. An appeal was preferred from the judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which affirmed the decision of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari to finally adjudicate upon the matter.
Laws involved: *US COPYRIGHT LAWS* § 102 (a) and (b) of the Copyrights Act, 1976 which states that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such work.”

Section 101 of the Copyrights Act, 1976 provides that a copyright is “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an orginal work of authorship”

Issues: Whether the copyright in Rural’s directory protects the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist. Analysis: The Supreme Court after looking at the Copyrights Act emphasized that the statute identifies three distinct elements and requires each to be met for a work to qualify as a copyrightable compilation: (1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing materials, facts, or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials, and (3) the creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, as an “original” work of authorship. Quoting the case of Mill Music¸469 U.S., at 164, the Supreme Court states that the “this tripartite conjunctive structure is self-evident, and should be assumed to ‘accurately express the legislative purpose.’ ” In the field of Copyright law, facts are not copyrightable as they are a product of mere discovery but the compilation thereof in different arrangements would be copyrightable as it satisfies the originality requirement (“an original work of authorship”). Therefore, in determining whether a fact-based work in an original work of authorship, it must be tested on the manner in which the collected facts have been selected, coordinated and arranged. For every arrangement of facts to past the muster, it must be selected, coordinated and arranged “in such a way” as to render the work as a whole original. The raw data which Rural had certainly did not satisfy the originality requirement. Rural Inc. may have been the first to discover and report the names, towns and telephone numbers of tis subscribers, but this data does not “owe its origin” to Rural. Rather, these bits of information are un-copyrightable facts; they existed before Rural Inc. reported them and would have continued to exist if Rural Inc. had never published a telephonic directory. Also, Rural did not truly “select” to publish the names and telephone numbers of its subscribers; rather it was required to do so by the Kansas Corporation Commissions as part of its monopoly franchise. Accordingly, it can be presumed that the selection was dictated by state law, not by Rural. Conclusion: The names, towns and telephones numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural’s combined white and yellow pages directory. As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. The alphabetic arrangement of subscriber’s information does not afford protection from copying as it utterly lacks originality. Therefore, Feist listings cannot constitute infringement.

Decision: The decision of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

Ratio: For a piece of work to get protection under copyrights law, the following conditions must be met –
a) the collection and assembly of pre-existing materials, facts, or data;
b) the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials, and
c) the creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, as an “original” work of authorship

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Copyright Case Brief – University of London Press, Limited v. University Tutorial Press, Limited.

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Citation –  [1916 U. 119.] [1916] 2 Ch. 601

Facts: The examiners (Professor Lodge and Mr. Jackson) were appointed for a matriculation examination of the University of London, a condition of appointment being that any copyright in the examination papers should belong to the University. The University agreed with the plaintiff company (University of London Press, Limited) to assign the copyright, and by deed purported to assign it to the plaintiff company. After the examination the defendant company (University Tutorial Press, Limited) issued a publication containing a number of examination papers (including three which had been set by two examiners who were co-plaintiffs), with criticisms on the papers and answers to questions. The university of London Press, Limited, commenced this action against the Tutorial Press, Limited, for infringement of copyright.

ISSUE I: Are examination papers within the meaning of this Act, ‘literary works’?

HOLDING: The Copyright Act (UK Law) provides for copyright in “every original literary dramatic musical and artistic work”. The term “literary work” has not been defined in the Act but according to the Act, “Literary work’ includes maps, charts, plans, tables and compilations”. It covers work, which is expressed in print, or writing, irrespective of the question whether the quality or style is high. The word “literary” refers to written or printed matter. The papers set by examiners entailed the exercise of brainwork, memory and trained judgment, and even selection of passages from other authors’ works involved careful consideration, discretion and choice and thus “literary works” within the meaning of the present Act.

ISSUE II: Assuming that the papers are “literary work”, the question is whether they are original?

HOLDING: “The word “original” does not mean that the work must be expression of original or inventive thought. Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought, and in the case of “literary work”, with the expression of thought in print or writing. The originality, which is required, relates to the expression of the thought. But the Act does not require that the expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work – that it should originate from the author.”
Examiners proved that they had thought out the questions which they set, and that they made notes or memoranda for future questions and drew on those notes for the purposes of the questions, which they set. The papers, which they prepared, originated from themselves, and were, within the meaning of the Act, original. The papers set by Professor Lodge and Mr. Jackson are “original literary work” and proper subject for copyright under the Act.

ISSUE III: In whom did the copyright in the examination papers vest when they had been prepared?

HOLDING: The examiner was employed to prepare the papers on the subject in respect of which he was elected or appointed examiner. He had to set papers for September, 1915, and January and June, 1916, and his duty also comprised the perusal of the students’ answers, and the consideration of the marks to be awarded to the answers. For this he was to be paid a lump sum.
He was free to prepare his questions at his convenience so long as they were ready by the time appointed for the examination, and it was left to his skill and

ISSUE IV: Whether the defendants have infringed the copyright in the papers prepared by  Professor Lodge and Mr. Jackson?

HOLDING: Examination papers are useful for educational purposes. Recognizing this demand, the plaintiff company published the matriculation papers. With the same object in view, the defendants published the “London Matriculation Directory,” which included the papers on arithmetic and algebra, geometry, and more advanced mathematics, set by Professor Lodge and judgment to decide what questions should be asked, having regard to the syllabus, the book work, and the standard of knowledge to be expected at the matriculation examination. It is true that the University issued instructions to examiners for the conduct of the examination, but these instructions are only regulations framed with a view to securing accuracy in the system of marking. Professor Lodge and Mr. Jackson were regularly employed in other educational establishments and were not part of the staff of the London University, and it was not suggested that the other examiners were on the staff of the University. Therefore, the examiner in such circumstances can be appropriately described as in contract for service with the University. The copyright was vested in the examiners, but the University was equitably entitled to it subject to the assignment agreement between the examiner and the University. The University assigned its rights to the plaintiff company, which is now equitably entitled to the copyright.
Mr. Jackson. The defendants on these facts contend that their publication of the three papers set by Professor Lodge and Mr. Jackson is a fair dealing with them for the purposes of private study under the Act, and is therefore not an infringement of copyright. It could not be contended that the mere republication of a copyright work was a “fair dealing” because it was intended for purposes of private study; nor, if an author produced a book of questions for the use of students, could another person with impunity republish the book with the answers to the questions. Both publications are intended for educational purposes and for the use of students but the defendants have failed to bring themselves within the protection of the Act. Therefore the plaintiffs ought to succeed so far as the questions prepared by Professor Lodge and Mr. Jackson for the examination in January, 1916, are concerne

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Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Notes – Case Briefs

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COPYRIGHT
1. University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch. 601
2. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
3. Baker v Selden 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
4. RG Anand v Delux Films AIR 1978 SC 1613
5. Nichols v Universal 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
6. Eastern Book Company v. DB Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1
7. CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 1 SCR 339
8. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 WLR 273
9. Walter v Lane [1900] AC 539
10. Eastern India Motion Pictures AIR 1977 SC 1443
11. Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India 2005 (30) PTC 253 Del
12. Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd. (1986) 1987 AIR (Delhi) 13
13. Zee Telefilms v. Sundial Communications (P) Ltd. 2003 (5) BomCR 404
14. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir, 2007)

PATENT

15. Biswanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v Hindustan Metal Industries AIR 1982 SC 1444
16. Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
17. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45
18. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)
19. Dimminaco A.G. v. Controller of Patents Designs (2002) I.P.L.R. 255
20. Novartis v Union of India AIR 2013 SC 1311
21. Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013)
22. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014)
23. University of Utah Research v. Ambry Genetics, Corp. 3 F. Supp. 3d 1213
24. Bayer v Union of India 2013 Indlaw IPAB 20
25. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. (Graver Tank II) 339 U.S. 605 (1950)
26. Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst [2005] RPC 9
27. Ravi Kamal Bali v Kala Tech, 2008 (38) PTC 435 (Bom)

 

TRADEMARK

28. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)
29. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.
30. Aggarwal Sweet Palace & Ors. V. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks
31. Imperial Tobacco Company v. Registrar of Trademark, AIR 1968 Cal 582
32. Amritdhara Pharmacy v Satyadeo AIR 1963 SC 449
33. F. Hoffmann-La Roche v Geoffrey Manners AIR 1970 SC 2062
34. Corn Products Refining v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd- AIR 1960 SC 142
35. Benz v Hybo Hindustan AIR 1994 Delhi 239
36. Balkrishna Hatcheries v Nandos Int’l Ltd 2007 (35) PTC 295
37. Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals 2001 (21) PTC 541 (SC)
38. ITC v. Philip Morris Products 2010 (42) PTC 572 (Del.)
39. Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Deputy Reg.- 2003 (27) PTC 422 Del
40. Pepsi Co. v Hindustan Coca-Cola Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 305
41. Dongre v. Whirlpool 1996 PTC (16)
42. Bollinger v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd [1960] 1 All ER 561
43. Reckitt & Colman v Borden [1990] 1 All E.R. 873
44. Venugopal v Ushodaya (2011) 4 SCC 85
45. Rolex SA v Alex Jewellery Pvt Ltd
46. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd

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Witnesses – Indian Evidence Law

Ramchandra Rambux v. Champabai

The Court is not confined only to the way in which the witnesses have deposed or to the demeanour of witnesses, but it is open to it to look into the surrounding circumstances as well as the probabilities, so that it may be able to form a correct idea of the trustworthiness of the witnesses. This issue cannot be determined by considering the evidence adduced in the Court separately from the surrounding circumstances which have also been brought out in the evidence, or which appear from the nature and contents of the document itself.

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan

Appellant Rameshwar was charged with committing rape with Mst. Purni. Asssitant Session Judge convicted the Rameshwar and sentenced him rigorous imprisonment. Appeal made to Session Judge the evidence was sufficient for moral conviction but fell short of legal proof because, in the court’s opinion, the law requires corroboration of the story of the prosecution in such cases as a matter of precaution and the corroborative evidence, is so far as it sought to connect the appellant with the crime, was legally insufficient though morally enough. The judge acquitted the accused giving him benefit of doubt. The High Court the learned judge certified that she did not understand the sanctity of an oath and accordingly did not administer one to her but he did not certify that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth. Oath act does not deal with competency.

As a matter of prudence a conviction should not be ordinarily be based on the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. The Court should look at the demeanor, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. No thumb rule applies in cases of these sorts. The Supreme Court concluded that by considering the conduct of the girl and her mother form start to finish, no corroboration beyond the statement of the child to her mother was necessary. High Court was right in holding that was enough to make it safe to act on her testimony. Direct the appellant to surrender to his bail.

Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra

Under s. 132 a witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any criminal proceeding (among others) upon the ground that the answer to such question will incriminate or may tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The safeguard to this compulsion is that no such answer, which the witness is compelled to give, exposes him to any arrest or prosecution or can it be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.

R. D. Nayak v. State of Gujarat

The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. It is also an accepted norm that, if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.

Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala

Leading question to be one which indicates to the witnesses the real or supposed fact which the prosecutor (plaintiff) expects and desires to have confirmed by the answer. The Court shall permit leading questions as to matters which are introductory or undisputed, or which have, in its opinion, been already sufficiently proved.

Pannayar v. State of Tamil Nadu

Suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between ‘may be true‘ and ‘must be true’ and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.

B. B. Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat

Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. On principle, the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding.

J. K. Govani v. State of Maharashtra

Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witnesses, or recall and reexamine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case (S.540, CrPC). The section is in two parts. The first part gives a discretionary power but the latter part is mandatory. The use of the word ‘many’ in the first part and of the word ‘shall’ the second firmly established this difference.

Under the first part, which is permissive, the court may act in any of three ways:

Summon any person as a witness,  Examine any person present in court although not summoned, and Recall or re-examine a witness already examined. The second part is obligatory and compels the Court to act in these three ways or any one of them if the just decision of the case demands where the court exercises the power under the second part, the inquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case. If the court has acted without the requirements of just decision, the action is open to criticism but if the court’s action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision the action cannot be regarded as exceeding the justification.

Ram Chander v. State of Haryana

The adversary system of trial being what it is, there is an unfortunate tendency for a judge presiding over a trial to assume the role of a referee or an umpire and to allow the trial to develop into a contest between the prosecution and the defence with the inevitable distortions flowing from combative and competitive element entering the trial procedure. The Court must actively participate in the trial to elicit the truth and to protect the weak and the innocent.

Raghunandan v. State of U.P.

In a criminal case, the fate of the proceeding cannot always be left entirely in the hands of the parties. The Court has also a duty to see that essential questions are not, so far as reasonably possible, left unanswered. The first proviso to Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, enacting that, despite the powers of the Court to put any question to a witness, the judgment must be based upon facts declared by the Act to be relevant, only serves to emphasize the width of the power of the Court to question a witness. The second proviso is this section preserves the privileges of witnesses to refuse to answer certain questions and prohibits only questions which would be considered improper under Section 148 and 149 of the Evidence Act.

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