Month: December 2017

Ramchandra Rambux v. Champabai

The Court is not confined only to the way in which the witnesses have deposed or to the demeanour of witnesses, but it is open to it to look into the surrounding circumstances as well as the probabilities, so that it may be able to form a correct idea of the trustworthiness of the witnesses. This issue cannot be determined by considering the evidence adduced in the Court separately from the surrounding circumstances which have also been brought out in the evidence, or which appear from the nature and contents of the document itself.

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan

Appellant Rameshwar was charged with committing rape with Mst. Purni. Asssitant Session Judge convicted the Rameshwar and sentenced him rigorous imprisonment. Appeal made to Session Judge the evidence was sufficient for moral conviction but fell short of legal proof because, in the court’s opinion, the law requires corroboration of the story of the prosecution in such cases as a matter of precaution and the corroborative evidence, is so far as it sought to connect the appellant with the crime, was legally insufficient though morally enough. The judge acquitted the accused giving him benefit of doubt. The High Court the learned judge certified that she did not understand the sanctity of an oath and accordingly did not administer one to her but he did not certify that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth. Oath act does not deal with competency.

As a matter of prudence a conviction should not be ordinarily be based on the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. The Court should look at the demeanor, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. No thumb rule applies in cases of these sorts. The Supreme Court concluded that by considering the conduct of the girl and her mother form start to finish, no corroboration beyond the statement of the child to her mother was necessary. High Court was right in holding that was enough to make it safe to act on her testimony. Direct the appellant to surrender to his bail.

Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra

Under s. 132 a witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any criminal proceeding (among others) upon the ground that the answer to such question will incriminate or may tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The safeguard to this compulsion is that no such answer, which the witness is compelled to give, exposes him to any arrest or prosecution or can it be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.

R. D. Nayak v. State of Gujarat

The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. It is also an accepted norm that, if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.

Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala

Leading question to be one which indicates to the witnesses the real or supposed fact which the prosecutor (plaintiff) expects and desires to have confirmed by the answer. The Court shall permit leading questions as to matters which are introductory or undisputed, or which have, in its opinion, been already sufficiently proved.

Pannayar v. State of Tamil Nadu

Suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between ‘may be true‘ and ‘must be true’ and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.

B. B. Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat

Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. On principle, the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding.

J. K. Govani v. State of Maharashtra

Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witnesses, or recall and reexamine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case (S.540, CrPC). The section is in two parts. The first part gives a discretionary power but the latter part is mandatory. The use of the word ‘many’ in the first part and of the word ‘shall’ the second firmly established this difference.

Under the first part, which is permissive, the court may act in any of three ways:

Summon any person as a witness,  Examine any person present in court although not summoned, and Recall or re-examine a witness already examined. The second part is obligatory and compels the Court to act in these three ways or any one of them if the just decision of the case demands where the court exercises the power under the second part, the inquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case. If the court has acted without the requirements of just decision, the action is open to criticism but if the court’s action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision the action cannot be regarded as exceeding the justification.

Ram Chander v. State of Haryana

The adversary system of trial being what it is, there is an unfortunate tendency for a judge presiding over a trial to assume the role of a referee or an umpire and to allow the trial to develop into a contest between the prosecution and the defence with the inevitable distortions flowing from combative and competitive element entering the trial procedure. The Court must actively participate in the trial to elicit the truth and to protect the weak and the innocent.

Raghunandan v. State of U.P.

In a criminal case, the fate of the proceeding cannot always be left entirely in the hands of the parties. The Court has also a duty to see that essential questions are not, so far as reasonably possible, left unanswered. The first proviso to Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, enacting that, despite the powers of the Court to put any question to a witness, the judgment must be based upon facts declared by the Act to be relevant, only serves to emphasize the width of the power of the Court to question a witness. The second proviso is this section preserves the privileges of witnesses to refuse to answer certain questions and prohibits only questions which would be considered improper under Section 148 and 149 of the Evidence Act.

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Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P.

The appellant has been convicted under s.302 IPC to which he has appealed. Bitter feeling existed between Manna and his son Ram Bharosey since long. The prosecution witness 1 thinks that Ram Bharosey certainly has his hands in his father’s murder. There is ample evidence that the relations between the appellant and his father were not cordial, that there were frequent quarrels between them resulting in partition, and that difference continues even thereafter. The evidence was accepted by the courts below as furnishing a motive for the crime. Reference to Ram’s conduct and to any communication made by him to his wife is not inadmissible under s.122. The testimony of PW 2 does not fall within inadmissibility of s.122, as it has reference to acts and conduct of the appellant and not to any communication made by him to his wife. Accordingly confirm with conviction under s.302 IPC.

State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh

The question of privilege raised under s.123 it is not part of Court’s jurisdiction to decide whether the disclosure of the given document would lead to any injury to public interest, that is a matter for the Head of the Department to consider and decide. No doubt the litigant whose claim may not succeed as a result of the non-production of the relevant and material document may feel aggrieved by the result, and the Court, in reaching the said decision, may feel dissatisfied; but that will not affect the validity of the basic principle that public good and interest must override considerations of private good and private interest. Therefore, in opinion of the court the conclusion appears inescapable that the documents in question are protected under s.123, and if the Head of the Department does not give permission for their production, the Court cannot compel the appellant to produce them. 

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Sri Chand Batra v. State of U.P.

Whether an Excise Inspector could be considered an expert whose opinion about the nature of a liquid found is opinion evidence admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act ?  The Court holds that Excise Inspector who had deposed at the very outset of his evidence that he had put in 21 years of  service as Excise Inspector and tested lacs of samples of liquor and illicit liquor, could be treated as an expert within the meaning of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. Dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence the appellant.

State of H.P. v. Jai Lal

In the year of 1983, a disease called ‘scab’ afflicted the apple orchards in different areas rendering the fruits unfit for human consumption. Feeling concerned about the heavy financial loss, keeping in view the danger to public health the scab affected apples were sold in markets, the state government took a policy decision to purchase the diseased fruits and destroy the same. In this operation about 3000 tons of scab affected apple were procured and destroyed at 195 centers set up for the purpose and @50 Rs. Per kilogram was paid to the concerned growers. Complaints of large scale misappropriation of government money were received. The government appointed Roop Singh Thakur then the Session Judge to examine the matter. The commission had concluded that some people had obtained false payments by showing inflated quantities of scabbed apple and had defrauded the government. Criminal charges were filed against the accused who denied the charges. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable the judge to form his independent judgment by the application of this criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with the other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and materials furnished which form the basis of his conclusions.

High Court in not placing any reliance upon the evidence of an expert witness on the ground that his evidence was merely an opinion unsupported by any reasons. Further there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, in support of the charge of conspiracy amongst the accused persons to cheat the State exchequer and with that object having entered inflated quantities of scabbed apple brought by the growers as already stated. the High Court was right in taking the view that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the accused persons and rightly acquitted them of the same.

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Bai Hira Devi v. Official Assignee of Bombay

Whether the appellants were entitled to lead oral evidence with a view to show the real nature of the impugned transaction. In deciding this question, it would be necessary to consider the true scope and effect of s.91 and s.92 of Evidence Act. As the Court observed the s.91 and s.92 really supplement each other. It is because s.91 by itself would not have excluded evidence of oral agreements which may tend to vary the terms of the document that s.92 has been enacted and if s.92 does not apply in the present case, there is no other section in evidence act which can be said to exclude evidence of the agreement set up by the appellants. The result is that s.92 is wholly inapplicable to the present proceedings and so the appellants are entitled to lead evidence in support of the plea raised by them. Accordingly set aside the decree passed by the High Court and send the appeal back to that Court for disposal on the merits in accordance with law.                

Gulzar Khan v. Smt. Vijay Lakshmi

The case is in respect to house No. 183 an agreement for sale for a consideration of Rs. 1,80,000 was executed with plaintiff on 15.11.1979 and part consideration was paid to the defendant vendor Rs. 50,000. The suit was contested by defendant alleging that possession of room was already handed over the plaintiff and this fact was duly mentioned in the agreement for sale. The trial court disbelieves the fact that possession was handed over to the plaintiff. The occasion came before High Court the expression terms in s.91 and s.92 must relate to statements, assertions or representations contained in the written contract which relate to the subject-matter of the contract and to something to be done or not to be done under the contract. The bar imposed by s.92 (1) applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of transaction and not when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that document is a sham. For that purpose, oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement.

In the present case, document itself has not been challenged but attempt was made to contradict a statement of fact, recorded in the document, and, that is how s.92 comes into play as held by Apex Court.

Bhawanbhai Premabhai v. Bai Vahali

The high court is of the opinion that the defendants were precluded by the provisions of s.92 of Evidence Act from giving oral evidence that the deed of sale was in reality intended by the executant to be a deed of gift. The defendants were allowed to lead evidence that the intention was to make a gift; it must be upon the footing that there was no intention to conclude contract, no contract, no sale, and no sale price. It there was a sale, price would be a term of contract evidence would be inadmissible to show that it was different from that mentioned in the deed.

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Deshpande v. Deshpande

The case is about a dispute between Gangabai and the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other hand in regard to the validity of the adoption of the plaintiff. The dispute was referred to an arbitrator, who stated the following: It is declared that the adoption of the plaintiff is not valid. It is declared that the right of adoption is lost to Gangabai from the very beginning. It is declared that the plaintiff is not and can never become entitled to the property belonging to the family of Devarao. The plaintiff’s claim is barred by estoppel as he received Rs. 8000  as a consideration for accepting the terms of compromise from the defendant and relinquished all rights which he then had or which he could ever have had in the future to the property belonging to the family of Devrao. The Court has concluded that the plaintiff was estopped from contending that Gangabai had the right to adopt him as a son to her deceased husband. The Apex Court held that therefore the suit filed by plaintiff is barred by estoppel, that he is not entitled to any relief which he has prayed for in his plaint, and the decree which has been passed by Trial Court and High Court have passed in his favor is liable to be set aside.

Shreedhar v. Munireddy

An estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of evidence which precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement previously made by himself.  If a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that, he consents to an act which has been done and that he will not offer any opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done and that he will not offer any opposition to it. Although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that which they otherwise might have abstained from, he cannot question the legality of the act he had sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. The factual conclusions arrived by the High Court, the appeal is bound to fail.

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